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The Indonesian Military in East Timor: The Secret Documents of Korem 164

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Since Indonesian troops landed on the beaches and parachuted into the cities on December 7, 1975, East Timor has been one of the most heavily militarized regions of the world. But reliable and precise information on the Indonesian military (ABRI) there, even basic information on the overall number of troops, has been scarce. ABRI officers and government officials, not surprisingly, have been uninterested in disclosing such information. Foreigners, including International Red Cross workers, were rarely permitted inside East Timor before 1989. While the Indonesian government has published a remarkable profusion of official pamphlets and books about the economic development of East Timor, complete with color photos and pie charts, it has not shown a similar industriousness in describing its military presence there.[1] Lacking official documentation and international monitoring, the best sources for information have been Catholic church officials and the guerrillas battling ABRI. East Timorese priests enumerated the various ABRI troops and supplied a copy of their report to Senator Claiborne Pell during his visit to East Timor in 1996.[2] The East Timorese guerrilla army, Falintil, has issued periodic updates on the military's operations and troop movements.[3] Additionally, the resistance has occasionally obtained sensitive ABRI documents, such as the torture manual captured in 1982 or the grisly photos of torture sessions somehow acquired, perhaps through

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[1] By my non-comprehensive listing, the government has 14 publications in Indonesian and English concerning the "development" of East Timor. The largest and most ambitious in this genre is *Dua Puluh Tahun Timor Timur Membangun* (Twenty Years of Development in East Timor) (Dili: Indonesian Civil Servants Corps, 1996). With such claims of economic development, Indonesia is, of course, only appropriating the reasoning the Dutch used to justify their colonization of the East Indies. A locus classicus of such reasoning is J. Langhout, *The Economic Conquest of Acheen* (The Hague: W.P. Van Stockum & Son, 1924).

[2] See the appendix to Sen. Pell's report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, June 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

[3] The most detailed of the four Falintil reports I have seen is "A Brief Overview of the Military Situation by Commander Dai Tula," for 1993. The monthly bulletin of a solidarity organization in Lisbon compiled an excellent analysis of the military situation in 1997 based on reports from inside East Timor, including numerous reports from the guerrillas. "Guerrilla War in East Timor," *Timor Leste* (April 1997). Falintil stands for Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste.

bribes, in 1997.[4] Seemingly loyal East Timorese working in ABRI offices as clerks, secretaries, and errand boys, have frequently passed onto the resistance secret documents concerning troop strength and counter-insurgency strategy.[5] Unfortunately, these documents have not always circulated outside of East Timor.

The cache of internal ABRI documents released in October 1998 represents a major breakthrough in our knowledge about the military occupation of East Timor.[6] The cache, consisting of 37 tables spread over 158 pages, reveals an unprecedented amount of new and reliable information. There is little doubt about the authenticity of the tables. They contain so much detailed information -- such as the names, ranks, birth dates, and identification numbers of hundreds of officers and intelligence agents -- that they could have only been generated within ABRI itself. The political attachés of the Western embassies in Jakarta, familiar with other types of ABRI documents, are convinced that the tables are genuine.[7] The original source inside East Timor remains unknown. Given that the first recipient of the documents was an Australian non-governmental organization, speculations about the documents being leaked to Western diplomats in Jakarta by disgruntled ABRI officers are certainly incorrect.[8]

The tables were generated by the personnel department of the military headquarters in Dili, East Timor (*Korem* 164). Each table is labeled in the upper left hand corner: Military Area Command (*Kodam*) IX, Udayana, Military Resort Command

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[4] A special supplement of the *Tapol Bulletin* (July 1983) published translations of the captured documents of 1982. Jose Ramos Horta released the torture photographs in 1997. They are posted on the website of the East Timor Human Rights Center (www.gn.apc.org/ethrc). One should note that the 1982 documents instructed officers to "avoid taking photographs showing torture in progress." If officers did take photos, the manual offered helpful advice: "remember not to have such photographic documentation developed outside of Den Pasar where it could be made available to the public by irresponsible elements."

[5] I happened to meet an East Timorese person in Dili who, while working in the Korem office for nine years, regularly passed on documents to the resistance forces. When the leak was discovered, the person was arrested, tortured, and then imprisoned for five years.

[6] For the first reports about the documents and their statistics for the total troop strength, see Don Greenlees, "Leak Shows No East Timor Troop Cuts," *The Australian*, 30 October 1998; Richard Parry, "Timor Military Retreat a 'Sham,'" *The Independent* (London), 30 October 1998; Barbara Crossette, "Army Pullback in East Timor Disputed by Leaked Reports," *New York Times*, 30 October 1998. Also see the press release of the East Timor Action Network (USA), "Documents Reveal Troop Levels Unchanged," 30 October 1998.

[7] See sources cited in note 6.

[8] Geoffrey Barker, "East Timor Leak May Be Aimed at Habibie," *Australian Financial Review*, 31 October 1998.

(*Korem*) 164, and labeled in the lower right hand corner: Head of Personnel Department.[9] The contents of the tables pertain only to troops within Korem 164, the command specifically covering East Timor. It is one of four Korems within Kodam IX (given the name Balinese name Udayana) which covers Indonesia's chain of islands from Bali to East Timor. All of the tables are either from 1997 or 1998. The original tables are not classified in any order. So that I may conveniently refer to them in the course of this article, I have numbered and listed them in the appendix.

This article will analyze these tables and relate them to what information we have from other sources concerning the military in East Timor.[10] The tables contain important data concerning the total number of troops presently stationed in East Timor, the veracity of Indonesia's claims to have withdrawn troops in late July-early August 1998, the deployment of the troops in various district commands and police stations, the presence of combat troops, the mobilization of para-military youth gangs, the role of the Special Forces (Kopassus), the number and ranks of East Timorese incorporated into the military, and the appointment of military officers to positions in the provincial civil administration.

Background on the Military in East Timor

The Indonesian military (ABRI) invaded the small half-island in 1975 with the expectation that the largely illiterate, pre-industrial, and unarmed population of about 700,000 would be quickly overawed. The generals in Jakarta confidently predicted that all resistance to the occupation would be defeated within two weeks. Twenty three years have passed and the East Timorese still show no sign of having accepted their forcible incorporation into Indonesia. Except for a brief cease-fire in 1983, military operations against the pro-independence forces, both armed and unarmed, have been incessant.[11]

The fighting during the first five years after Indonesia's invasion were particularly severe and convulsive. Many East Timorese initially fled into the jungles and waged their resistance from there. As ABRI's troops encircled them on the ground and bombed them from the air, they were forced out of the hills and herded into Indonesian-controlled resettlement camps (which were, in effect, concentration camps). These were the years of

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[9] *Komando Doerah Militer IX, Udayana, Komando Resor Militer 164* is in the upper left corner. *Kepala Seksi Personil* is in the lower right. According to Table 7, the head of the personnel department in Korem 164 is Lt. Col. Haning Tjipto S. (born September 15, 1951, serial number 30999, assumed present post on July 15, 1997).

[10] To a great extent, the analysis of these documents has been a collective project. I would like to thank Carmel Budiardjo, Liem Soei Liong, Andrew McNaughton, and George Aditjondro for their help.

[11] Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War Against East Timor* (London: Zed, 1984); John Taylor, *Indonesia's Forgotten War -- The Hidden History of East Timor* (London: Zed, 1991). Gabriel Defert's book is particularly useful for its many maps, charts and graphs: *Timor Est: Le Génocide Oublié* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992).

mass deaths due to starvation, disease, and warfare.[12] ABRI succeeded in shattering the solidity of the armed resistance by 1980. As many as 200,000 East Timorese perished. The number of ABRI soldiers killed remains unknown but may exceed 20,000.

The armed resistance reorganized itself in the early 1980s under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão. By that time, the East Timorese harbored no expectation that they would be able to eject the Indonesian military by force of arms. The main purpose of maintaining a guerrilla army was to prove that the East Timorese were not a conquered people. Falantil managed to survive throughout the 1980s, miraculously enough, despite a series of large-scale counterinsurgency operations (Operation Security, 1981; Operation Clean Sweep, 1983; Operation Unity, 1984, etc.). ABRI generals proclaimed each new operation to be the final blow against the guerrillas only to find them rise again Phoenix-like from the assault.

Xanana Gusmão, the leader throughout the long dark years of the 1980s, reorganized the resistance in 1988-89 to bring a greater sense of cohesiveness to it.[13] The guerrilla army, Falintil, had been under the authority of the political party Fretilin. Under Gusmão's *reajustamento estrutural* of 1988-89, Fretilin subsumed itself under a new coalition of all nationalist parties, the CNRM, and Falintil became the armed wing of the CNRM.[14]

The opening up of East Timor to foreign visitors in early 1989 provided new opportunities for non-violent demonstrations in the streets to gain international media exposure. Though the protesters were invariably beaten up and arrested, sometimes tortured and executed, they were committed to bringing East Timor to the attention of the world. All of the demonstrations from 1989 to 1991 were held during the visits of foreign dignitaries (such as Pope John Paul in October 1989 and U.S. ambassador John Monjo in January 1990). The massacre in Dili on November 12, 1991 occurred soon after the East Timorese had prepared to receive a Portuguese parliamentary delegation that tragically never arrived.[15]

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[12] Paulino Gama, "The War in the Hills, 1975-85: A Fretilin Commander Remembers," in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation* (London: Cassell, 1995).

[13] See the documents in Xanana Gusmão, *Timor Leste: Um Povo, Uma Pátria* (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, 1994), pp. 95-115. Also, *Tempo*, "Wawancara dengan Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão," October 10 - November 16, 1998; Malcolm Gault-Williams, "Funu -- Liberation War -- Continues in East Timor," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 22: 3 (July-September 1990).

[14] Fretilin stands for Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente; CNRM is Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere. The term "Maubere" was replaced by "Timor" in early 1998 so the organization is now known as CNRT, or National Council of Timorese Resistance. The first meeting of the CNRT was held in April 1998 in Peniche, Portugal. It was attended by 220 East Timorese, many of whom are living in exile in North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Macau.

[15] Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine's book contains a fascinating insider's account of the organizing of these demonstrations in the 1989-91 period. *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance* (Boston: South End Press, 1997), pp. 105-208. Also see, Andrew McMillan, *Death in Dili*

It is certainly remarkable that in a small country the size of Connecticut, with the population of downtown Boston, armed insurgents have been able to persevere after twenty three years of unrestrained onslaughts by the military of the world's fourth largest country equipped with sophisticated weaponry from United States and Europe.[16] Today, the Indonesian government consistently claims that there are no more than two hundred rebels, contemptuously called Security Disturbance Gangs (GPK), who do not represent the genuine wishes of the majority of the East Timorese people.[17] Thus, the reason for the continued presence of thousands of troops in East Timor -- 12,000 in July 1998 according to Col. Tono Suratman, the commander of Korem 164 -- should be puzzling to any outside observer. Suratman stated that half of the total troop strength consisted of combat troops devoted to fighting the insurgency and half consisted of "territorial" troops (that is, troops who would be stationed in East Timor even without the insurgency).[18] His figures are too low, as will be discussed later, but let assume for the moment that they are valid. It is strange that only 200 guerrillas, confined to the hills, should necessitate 6,000 combat troops when 6,000 troops are already stationed in East Timor on a year-round basis. By Suratman's figures, there is a 60:1 ratio between soldiers and guerrillas, an astonishingly high ratio that should, by military rules of thumb, guarantee success for a counterinsurgency operation.

That ABRI should have failed to defeat the insurgency with such an overwhelming superiority in troops and weapons can only be explained by the universal opposition to the Indonesian military among the East Timorese. As is immediately apparent to anyone visiting East Timor, many hundreds of guerrilla fighters, perhaps over 1,000, continue to survive in the hills because of the passionate support they receive from the people in the villages and cities. Within the first hour of my visit to East Timor in August 1998, I was approached by an elderly barefoot beggar while sitting in a restaurant. By his looks and mannerisms, I presumed him to be senile. My host whispered to me after he had left, pocketing the money we had given him, that he was actually a courier for the guerrillas who kept up the appearance of insanity in order to avoid suspicion. The East Timorese, even some of the apparent collaborators of the Indonesians, send money, food,

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(Rydalmere: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992); and K. Sword and P. Walsh, eds., *'Opening Up': Travellers' Impressions of East Timor 1989-1991* (Australia East Timor Association, 1991).

[16] East Timor covers an area of 14,609 sq. kilometers (5,639 sq. miles) and has a population (in 1994) of 814,171.

[17] ABRI was claiming as early as the mid-1980s that there were only 200 guerrillas. See, Benedict Anderson, "East Timor: Ten Years After Integration," *Inside Indonesia* (December 1986). In 1995, the commander for East Timor stated that there were no more than 180 guerrillas. Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 158. A reporter hosted by ABRI in 1997 wrote that "perhaps as few as 100" guerrillas still operate in the hills. Dale Andradé, "Indonesia's Conflict," *Soldier of Fortune* (September 1997). Andradé reported ABRI's total troop strength in East Timor to be 10,000, meaning a 100: 1 advantage for ABRI.

[18] *Gatra*, "Mereka Meninggalkan Dili," 8 August 1998.

and supplies into the hills, often at great risk to themselves. The guerrillas and their supporters always face the danger of betrayal given the ubiquity of the military's intelligence agents and their use of torture to extract information. Nevertheless, there are large clandestine networks of people even in the capitol city of Dili who know how to contact the guerrillas; it has been possible for East Timorese civilians, foreign journalists, and Indonesian solidarity activists to be secretly and safely transported into the hills for meetings with them.[19]

Though the military value of the guerrillas, and their number, has steadily declined since the fighting of the mid to late 1970s, they remain the symbol of the resistance, the living proof that the East Timorese refuse to acquiesce in the foreign occupation of their country. As one student leader in Dili told me, "they are the soul of our struggle."[20] The guerrillas have had little difficulty in recruiting new fighters from the civilian population after the death of rank and file soldiers. Nor have they had difficulties in replacing senior commanders when one is killed or captured.[21] The guerrillas, always on the move (even when badly injured), have tended to avoid engagements and flee through the hills when attacked. Generally speaking, their actions have been either sporadic ambushes on military convoys or surprise raids on military outposts.[22]

Indonesia has maintained thousands of troops in East Timor despite the fact that serious battles with the armed resistance had almost entirely ceased by the early 1980s. With so many troops in East Timor, far in excess of what would be needed to defeat a ragtag malnourished guerrilla force, Indonesia has been waging an undeclared war on the East Timorese people as a whole. It is no exaggeration to say that the East Timorese live

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[19] I know of six meetings between foreigners and the guerrillas though there have undoubtedly been more: Robert Domm in September 1990, the journalist Jill Jolliffe in August 1994, the British filmmaker Don Rotheroe in August 1996, the U.S. author Matthew Jardine in November 1996, an Australian journalist for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in August 1998, and Indonesian solidarity activists in August 1998.

[20] Oral interview, August 1998.

[21] After Xanana Gusmão was captured on November 20, 1992, he remained the titular commander of Falintil. The porosity of Indonesian prisons has meant that he has been able to continue giving orders and making strategic decisions based on the information he receives. But the direct command of the guerrillas on the ground has been transferred to the deputy commander. This position was first assumed by Ma'Huno until his capture in April 1993. Nino Konis Santana was then selected as deputy commander. When he died from a fall in the forest in March 1998, Taur Mantan Ruak was chosen as his replacement. The third in command under Santana, David Alex, was captured and killed in June 1997.

[22] On guerrilla strategy, see Robert Domm's interview with Xanana, *Inside Indonesia* (December 1990). Recent actions of Falintil have included an ambush of a military truck on May 24, 1997, during the Indonesian elections. The guerrillas killed the 14 soldiers who were riding in it. In November 1998, they raided an army headquarters in Same (Manufahi district), kidnapped two officers of the 744 battalion, and held them hostage in protest of ABRI's spate of killings in nearby Alas. They also captured 40 guns and 3800 rounds of ammunition.

like captives of war, at the mercy of their captors. One can hardly find an East Timorese who can not recite a lengthy list of family members, friends, and neighbors killed by ABRI forces.

When they invaded, the Indonesians had only a handful of collaborators. Today, they still have only a handful, mostly the same people and their relatives. The indiscriminate, wholesale killing and torture have made collaboration impossible for all but a few hardened souls.[23] Since even their collaborators have not always proved trustworthy, the Indonesian occupiers view all East Timorese with suspicion.

While Indonesia justifies its massive troop presence in East Timor as necessary to combat the guerrillas, it is the unarmed civilian population that bears the brunt of the repression. Like any army of occupation, the Indonesian army resorts to reprisals against the civilian population whenever there is an attack on its troops by the guerrillas. It has also resorted to killing unarmed demonstrators demanding independence. One of the most horrendous massacres, certainly the best documented, was on November 12, 1991, when Indonesian troops opened fire on a peaceful demonstration in Dili and killed at least 271 men, women, and children. It was a fairly precise re-enactment the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in India in 1919: the soldiers lined up in rows and repeatedly fired into a dense crowd of people who, because of the congestion and the enclosing walls, were unable to quickly flee. Unlike the soldiers of the British-commanded Indian army, they broke out of their line formation and began chasing and shooting people as they fled.[24]

Despite the optimistic assessments of ABRI's foreign supporters that ABRI was reforming itself in the wake of this massacre, the officers responsible were not seriously disciplined and the government officials in Jakarta were unrepentant. They consistently lied about the extent of the killing and justified what killing had taken place as a reasonable response to demonstrators doing nothing more than shouting anti-government

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[23] One of the main collaborating families is that of Jose Osorio Soares who was the secretary general of the pro-integrationist party Apodeti at the time of the 1975 invasion. Jose was killed by Fretilin members soon after the invasion. His brother, Abilio, has been the governor of East Timor since 1992. Another brother, Qitu, serves as an assistant to the governor. His brother-in-law, Gil Alvez, controls much of the liquor trade in East Timor. His son, Octavio, formed the East Timor Student Movement with money from Lt. Gen. Prabowo and an ideology taken from European fascist philosophers. His "movement" has, by his own admission, only three core members. *Berita Cerita Derita Timor Leste* (Yogyakarta, July 1998). The Carrascalao family, one of whose members, Mario, served as governor for ten years (1982-92), now largely works with the CNRT although Mario himself is still an official of the government.

[24] Two US journalists, Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman, were fortunate to have survived the massacre. See Nairn's foreward to Pinto and Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle*. A British photographer, Steven Cox, also survived and published his photos of it in *Generations of Resistance: East Timor* (London: Cassell, 1995). A Malaysian youth, Kamal Bamadhaj, did not survive it. His sister Nadiah has lovingly assembled his personal letters concerning his activism: *Aksi Write* (Selangor, Malaysia: Rhino Press, 1997).

slogans.[25] The governor at the time, Mario Carrascalao, has recently confirmed what the resistance and the Catholic church has reported all along: that soldiers killed more people in the two days after the massacre, including the wounded being treated at the Dili hospital.[26] Newly leaked Australian classified documents reveal that Lt. Gen. Prabowo informed the Australian ambassador in late 1991 that the military killed about 20-25 more people after the massacre by burning and dynamiting their bodies.[27]

The Indonesians have avoided another massacre of that magnitude since but have continued the killing on a more individualized basis. The problem of extra-judicial killing is perhaps the most serious human rights issue in East Timor today. During the first half of 1998, the military averaged one murder of an unarmed East Timorese every five days. The Peace and Justice Commission run by the Nobel prize-winner Bishop Carlos Belo documented 25 extra-judicial killings by the Indonesian security forces for the first six months of 1998.[28] The legal aid and civil rights organization in Dili, Yayasan Hak, documented 23 fatalities over the same period.[29] Putting the two reports together, one finds evidence of 36 victims of extra-judicial killing by the military. (See Table A below.)

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[25] John Haseman, a former military attaché at the U.S. embassy in Jakarta, defended ABRI's record in East Timor and contended the massacre, or "incident" as he called it, was a minor aberration that was being rectified: "Catalyst for Change in Indonesia: The Dili Incident," *Asian Survey*, 35: 8 (August 1995). For the reality of the massacre's aftermath that Haseman ignores, see Peter Carey's introduction to the Steve Cox book, *Generations of Resistance*; and "Getting Away with Murder," *Inside Indonesia* (June 1996). Soon after taking office, President Habibie appointed Lt. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, the overall commander for East Timor at the time of the massacre and one of the few officers who received token disciplinary action, as his senior military advisor. Thus, Panjaitan has been fully rehabilitated.

[26] *The Age* (Australia), "Dili Deaths 'Just the Start,'" 18 November 1998.

[27] Agence France Presse (AFP), 18 November 1998.

[28] Komisi Keadilan dan Perdamaian Keuskupan Dili, "Laporan Perkembangan HAM di Timor Timur, Semester I, 1998," (Dili, August 1998).

[29] Yayasan Hak, "Laporan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur," (Dili, July 1998). If ABRI is to withdraw troops from East Timor, it might start with removing the soldiers it places just across the street from Yayasan Hak's office to stand under a tree all day and monitor the people coming and going.

TABLE A
Extra-judicial Killings by the Military, January 1 to June 30, 1998

	Unit(s) of ABRI Responsible	Date	Location (kecamatan, kabupaten)	Fatalities	Description
1	Rajawali and Halilintar Team	January 4	Atabae, Bobonaro	4	Attack on a home of suspected supporters of guerrillas.
2	Kopassus and Halilintar Team	January 10	Cailako, Bobonaro	1	Victim suspected of having met guerrillas.
3	BTT 144 and SGI	January	Hatolia, Ermera	3	Circumstances unknown.
4	Kopassus	February 2	Maliana, Bobonaro	1	Victim named as guerrilla supporter by two men who had been interrogated and tortured.
5	Rajawali	February 5	Venilale, Baucau	1	Victim grazing cattle in hills, killed on suspicion of being a guerrilla.
6	Police	February 10	Timomar, Kova-Lima	1	Peasant suspected of supporting guerrillas.
7	SGI Ermera and Liquica	March 21	Bazartete, Liquica	3	Raid on house. Victims suspected of supplying arms to guerrillas.
8	SGI Dili	April 14	Dili	1	Attack on home of person suspected of holding secret meetings. Corpse taken and buried by military.
9	Rajawali, Kopassus, and BTT	April 15	Baucau city	2	Attack on home of suspected supporters of guerrillas. Victims were women.
10	Koramil 3 and Kodim 1638	April 22	Lissaiku, Liquica	7	Circumstances unknown.
11	Rajawali	April 28	Quelecai, Baucau	2	Circumstances unknown.
12	Koramil 3 and BTT 621	May 7	Maubara, Liquica	1	Victim suspected of being clandestine leader of resistance.
13	Kopassus and Saka Team	May 10	Baucau city	2	Circumstances unknown.
14	Kopassus, Rajawali, and Saka Team	May 22	Baucau city	2	Raid on house of suspected supporter of guerrillas.
15	Koramil 3, Rajawali, and BTT 621	May	Maubara, Liquica	1	Circumstances unknown.
16	Rajawali	June 8	Iliomar, Lautem	1	Victim walking on road to Fuat, stopped by Rajawali troops. Suspected of meeting guerrillas.
17	Youth gang	June 14	Viqueque, Viqueque	1	Victim brother of

	patronized by ABRI				suspected supporter of guerrillas.
18	BTT 315	June 16	Manatuto city	1	Victim shot for taking army-owned wood by the roadside as added weight for the back of his pickup truck.
19	Paramilitary gangs (Alfa Team, etc.)	June 28	Manatuto city	1	Shooting on truck full of pro-independence demonstrators.
20	SGI Dili	June 29	Baucau city	1	Firing into crowd greeting three European ambassadors visiting Baucau bishop.
	Total Number of Extra-judicial killings			36	

Sources: Yayasan Hak, "Laporan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur," (Dili, July 1998); Komisi Keadilan dan Perdamaian Keuskupan Dili, "Laporan Perkembangan HAM di Timor Timur, Semester I, 1998," (Dili, August 1998).

The U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva ordered an investigation into extra-judicial killing after the 1991 Dili massacre. Considering East Timor's political status as outside of its purview, the UNHRC has simply urged Indonesia to end the killing of civilians and the torture and ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners. The 1994 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions dismissed the methods and findings of the Indonesian government's inquiry into the 1991 massacre and called for a new commission. He pointedly demanded "a drastic reduction of the military presence in East Timor," not only of combat troops "but all troops present in the territory."[30]

The UNHRC concluded an agreement with the Indonesian government in April 1998 for assigning the U.N. Development Program office in Jakarta the task of assisting the government in creating a national plan for the promotion of human rights. The agreement does not specify that UNDP personnel will be involved in monitoring troop levels in East Timor nor does it provide for the stationing of any monitors in East Timor itself. The vague and unambitious nature of this agreement led the international representative of the East Timorese resistance, Jose Ramos-Horta, to say that it was "of no interest at all" to East Timor.[31]

The Non-Withdrawal of Troops

The United Nations and nearly all countries of the world still consider Portugal to be the administering power over East Timor. Since the Indonesian military invaded as the Portuguese colonial authorities were departing, the East Timorese have never had the opportunity to exercise a choice over their status as a nation.[32] Indonesia's military occupation of East Timor has the same status in international law as Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990. The U.N. has a legitimate reason, if not a duty, to intervene in East Timor so that an act of self-determination, a referendum on independence, can be arranged. The obvious obstacle to this goal is Indonesia's military which has been

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[30] The report is conveniently reprinted in Geoffrey Gunn, *East Timor and the United Nations: The Case for Intervention* (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1997), document 8.

[31] On the agreement, see *International Herald Tribune*, "Jakarta Avoids U.N. Rights Censure," 25 April 1998; Lusa (a news agency in Portugal), "Jose Ramos-Horta, U.N.-Indonesia Accord on Human Rights is 'Derisory,'" 14 August 1998.

[32] Roger S. Clark, "The 'Decolonization' of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-determination and Aggression," in Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) and International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET), *International Law and the Question of East Timor* (London: CIIR and IPJET, 1995). No government accepts Indonesia's claim that the vote in favor of integration with Indonesia by the 37-member East Timor Provincial Assembly on May 31, 1976 represents a valid act of self-determination. The assembly members had been elected by a small number of voters in transparently fraudulent, ABRI-organized elections during a time of widespread warfare and displacement. See James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed* (Sydney: ABC Books, 1996), pp. 262-66.

brutally suppressing any expression of support for independence. The precondition for a referendum would be a lessening of ABRI's presence and its arbitrary powers to kill and torture.

Soon after the fall of President Suharto on May 21, 1998, his newly installed replacement, B.J. Habibie launched a fresh initiative regarding East Timor. The international problems that Indonesia has faced because of its illegal occupation -- such as U.S. Congressional bans on military training and arms transfers -- prompted Habibie to search for a seemingly clever halfway position between the continued military occupation and total independence. He proposed that the East Timorese accept a special status as a semi-autonomous province of Indonesia and, in exchange for this concession from Indonesia, relinquish all claim to independence. The East Timorese resistance has offered to accept autonomy status as long as it will be considered a stepping stone towards a referendum on independence rather than a dead end.[33]

As part of Habibie's reforms, the Foreign Minister Ali Alatas entered U.N.-mediated negotiations with Portugal in early August. ABRI announced, with great fanfare, a partial withdrawal of some of its combat troops from East Timor one week prior to the start of the talks in New York City and two days prior to the arrival in Jakarta of U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen. The Indonesian government intended this withdrawal to prove its good faith before the international community in reducing the tension in East Timor. On July 28, a military band played on the Dili docks and journalists snapped photos of the 400 infantry soldiers boarding a ship.[34] The puppet governor, Abilio Soares, paid the troops a perfunctory tribute for their services in East Timor. Another 700 soldiers departing a week and a half later -- after the Cohen visit and the New York U.N. meetings -- left without the music and photo opportunities.

The U.N. General Secretary, Kofi Annan, meeting with Alatas and the Portuguese Foreign Minister in early August, encouraged Indonesia to continue the withdrawal of its troops.[35] Annan's special advisor on East Timor, Jamshed Marker, also called for a reduction in troop levels as a "confidence building measure." William Cohen had recommended a withdrawal of troops during his visit to Jakarta on August 1. Alatas told

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[33] The Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, has outlined the autonomy proposal in an interview with the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 August 1998. He reiterated the old argument that "a referendum [on independence] is out of the question" since "an assessment of the wishes of the people already took place 22 years ago in 1976." Significantly, Jakarta does not plan on allowing the East Timorese to vote on this autonomy proposal. It has been trying to convince Portugal and leaders of the resistance to accept it and then cooperate in convincing the East Timorese to accept it. Habibie and Alatas' hopes that Xanana Gusmão would play the role of Yasir Arafat and sign onto a secretly negotiated deal have already been ruined by his adamant rejection of their proposals. See Xanana Gusmão's op-ed, "From a Jakarta Prison Cell," *Washington Post*, 21 October 1998.

[34] *Kompas*, 29 July 1998; *Gatra*, "Mereka Meninggalkan Dili," 8 August 1998.

[35] Annan again urged a reduction in the number of troops in October. Associated Press (AP), 13 October 1998.

the press: "He [Cohen] hopes the withdrawal will go on. I've confirmed it will go on."[36] Combined with the autonomy plan for East Timor that Habibie offered in early June, these troop withdrawals appeared to be the beginning of a new policy that portended a reduction of the violence.

Hopes for a reduced military presence in East Timor were dashed in late October when leaked internal military documents revealed that no withdrawals had taken place and that the number of troops far exceeded the various figures to which Indonesian officials had previously admitted. The Army's information officer had told the assembled journalists on the Dili docks on July 28 that the total number of troops was, prior to the withdrawal, 12,700.[37] His boss, Col. Tono Suratman, gave journalists the slightly different figure of 12,000.[38] With the announced departure of 700 more soldiers on August 8, a total of 1,100 troops should have been withdrawn by mid-August. The remaining troops should have numbered 11,600 (going by the figures of the information officer).

The Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, stated just two days before the news of the leaked documents appeared in the press that a total of 1,300 soldiers had been withdrawn (200 soldiers more than ABRI officers had previously claimed) and that "nearly 100 percent" of those left were non-combat troops.[39] This flatly contradicted the figures cited by the commander of the East Timor command, Col. Tono Suratman, who had informed journalists that there were about 6,000 combat troops.[40] If all the combat troops had been removed, as Alatas claimed, close to 6,000 soldiers would have departed from East Timor during August and September. But Alatas claimed that only 1,300 soldiers had been removed.

The leaked documents reveal that there were, in fact, almost 8,000 combat troops in East Timor by the end of August. The number of military personnel in the territorial command -- the regular, year-round structure of military rule -- was close to 10,000. Thus, the actual number of troops was close to 18,000 -- a figure over 50% higher than what Col. Suratman and his spokesperson had claimed on July 28 (See Table B).

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[36] Reuters, "US Wants More Indonesian Troops Out of Timor," 1 August 1998.

[37] Richard Parry, "Timor military retreat 'a sham,'" *The Independent* (London), 30 October 1998,

[38] *Gatra*, "Mereka Meninggalkan Dili," 8 August 1998.

[39] Reuters, 28 October 1998.

[40] *Gatra*, "Mereka Meninggalkan Dili," 8 August 1998.

When faced with this new figure of 18,000, the Chief of Staff of the military in East Timor, Lt. Col. Supadi, improvised and told journalists that there were 15,000 soldiers in the combat battalions and territorial commands and 3,000 civilians in militia groups: "there are still many civilians who have been trained in military exercises and they also carry guns. On several occasions such as operations they wear military uniforms." If the soldiers and the militias were added together, Supadi suggested that 18,000 "might" be an accurate number.[41] What Supadi did not apparently realize was that the leaked documents also provided statistics on those in the civilian militias. In August 1998, there were a little over 2,000 militia members, bringing the total number of military personnel in East Timor to 20,000.

The spokesman of the Kodam IX office in Bali, Lt. Col. Made Runa, decided to deny the 18,000 figure rather than qualify it as Supadi had. He told Reuters, "Do not believe in news from any other source. We have only 3,000 soldiers in East Timor in total."[42] Gen. Wiranto, the Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of the Indonesian military, declined to say what he thought the correct figure was. He simply stated that the 18,000 figure was too high and dismissed the validity of the documents altogether.[43]

The secret documents contain four tables on the total troop strength in East Timor from November 1997 to August 1998 (Tables 1a-1d). The number of troops actually increased during this period from 15,912 to 17,914. Despite the hype about the troop withdrawals in late July and early August, the table dated August 1998 reflects no reductions from the previous month. In fact, there was a slight increase: from 17,834 in July to 17,914 in August.[44]

With 18,000 soldiers stationed there, the ratio of soldiers to civilians in East Timor is far above the Indonesian average. ABRI's total number of soldiers and officers is about 475,000 (as of 1995).[45] The ratio of military personnel to civilians for Indonesia as a whole is one to 420. For East Timor, where the population is about 815,000, the ratio is one to 45. This means that East Timor has nine times more soldiers per capita than an average province in Indonesia.

Looking at these four tables 1a -1d, one finds that ABRI divides its troops into two broad categories: territorial (*organik Korem*) and combat (*penugasan*, literally 'on assignment'). The number of territorial troops increased only two percent from November 1997 to August 1998. The number of combat troops, however, increased 29 percent (from 6172 to 7938). Therefore, even if ABRI had withdrawn 1,100 combat troops in July and early August (or Alatas' 1,300), the number of combat troops would still have been higher than the level eight months prior. ABRI was proposing to do nothing more than make a six percent reduction after it has just made an eleven percent increase.

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[41] Karen Polglaze and Buni Yani, "Indonesia admits 18,000 troops may be in East Timor," AAP, 30 October 1998. Lt. Col. Supadi is listed as the Chief of Staff (*Kepala Staf Korem*, or *Kasrem*) on Table 7.

[42] Michael Perry, "Indonesia Increased East Timor Troops - Documents," Reuters, 30 October, 1998.

[43] AFP, 4 November 1998.

[44] The table for August refers to the troop levels at the end of the month. There is separate table for early August -- *Awal Agustus*.

[45] Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, appendix and p. 109.

The East Timorese resistance had been claiming from August onwards that some of the departing troops were being replaced, that those leaving were part of a normal rotation of troops, and that some were simply leaving by one port and arriving back by another. Xanana Gusmão stated that about 3,500 troops had replaced the some 1,000 troops that had left: "No cameramen were invited to watch their arrival, for they landed at secret army jetties at Viqueque, Com, and Carabelo, near Vemasse."[46] These tables certainly give credence to the idea that the troop withdrawal promised by Habibie and Alatas was part of an elaborate shell game. Troops were moved about but no reduction in their overall number took place.

The East Timorese resistance's previous estimates on the number of ABRI troops now appear to be on the low side. Xanana Gusmão stated in 1990 that there were about 10,000 troops in East Timor.[47] In 1996-97, FALINTIL again put the number of troops at about 10,000 troops.[48]

Indonesian officials, appearing to be uncharacteristically forthcoming about the number of troops in East Timor this year, only obfuscated the issue by supplying a jumble of inconsistent statistics. In a single day, high-ranking ABRI officers offered figures from 3,000 to 18,000. To explain the great variation in figures its officials have so far supplied, the Indonesian government will either have to claim that its military is so mismanaged and anarchic that it has no idea how many soldiers it has stationed in East Timor, or that it has been consciously dissembling to hide the truth.

The unreliability of the Indonesian government in reporting on the deployment of its troops in a territory still considered illegally occupied under international law suggests that U.N. monitors should be placed in East Timor to ascertain exactly how many are there. Indonesia has obviously ignored the U.N. Special Rapporteur's 1994 demand for a "drastic reduction" in troop levels. The East Timorese resistance has called for U.N. monitors, as has the Australian Labor Party's spokesperson on foreign affairs, Laurie Brereton.[49]

Structure of the Occupation Forces: Territorial and Combat Troops

The distribution of these 17,914 troops in the various military headquarters and units, as of August 1998, is revealed in Tables 2c and 3d. East Timor is divided into 13 districts (*kabupaten*). Each district possesses a "civil" administration, headed by an appointed official, a *bupati*, who may also be a military officer. Each district possesses its own military command headed by a Colonel: the *Kodim* (*Komando Distrik Militer*). The territorial troops, what the tables refer to as *organik Korem*, are located at the Korem office itself in Dili and spread throughout the thirteen Kodims. There, they are given the general and ill-defined task of "maintaining security." Each of the thirteen Kodims

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[46] Xanana Gusmão, "A Solution for East Timor," paper read at University of Auckland conference, 10 September 1998. Also, AFP, "Rebels Claim Indonesia Sent Fresh Troops into East Timor," 11 September 1998.

[47] Robert Domm's interview with Xanana, *Inside Indonesia* (December 1990).

[48] "Guerrilla War in East Timor," *Timor Leste* (Lisbon, April 1997).

[49] Press release of Brereton's statement, 25 October 1998.

controls an average of five lower level commands called Koramils (*Komando Daerah Militer*). There are 62 Koramils in East Timor, each commanded by an officer with the rank of a Captain or Lieutenant. (Table 22 supplies the name and rank of each Koramil commander.) At the lowest level, one finds the *Babinsa* (*Bintara Pembina Desa*) which covers a single village and is headed up by a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). This military hierarchy, what is called the "territorial structure," exists throughout Indonesia: the country is divided into ten Kodams, 39 Korems, 271 Kodims, 3818 Koramils, and roughly 25,000 Babinsas. The military's basic structure in occupied East Timor has simply been patterned on its steel framework for Indonesia as a whole.

Human rights reports have always identified the army's intelligence unit, SGI (*Satuan Tugas Intelijen*, or *Satgas Intel* for short), as the unit primarily responsible for the arbitrary arrests and torture of detainees. The SGI headquarters in Dili, colloquially known by the East Timorese as the "Red House," is located in the neighborhood of Colmera. These leaked documents do not reveal anything specific pertaining to SGI, except to give the names of the heads of the intelligence branches in the Korem and Kodims (Tables 5, 6, and 22). The Korem office has an intelligence branch, as does each of the thirteen Kodim offices.

In addition to the army soldiers and intelligence agents, policemen are stationed in the districts. The police, considered part of the military, are listed as territorial troops (Table 2c). ABRI announced in September 1998 that the police would, at some unspecified date in the future, be separated out from ABRI's command and established as an independent agency.[50] But for the present the police are still an integral part of the military in Indonesia and of the occupation forces in East Timor.

ABRI has 3,998 soldiers and officers and 2,347 policemen stationed in the thirteen districts for a combined total of 6,345 men. The government considers these "territorial" personnel as "organic" to the administration of East Timor and meant to be kept in East Timor regardless of whether a guerrilla insurgency exists or not.

Apart from the Kodim troops and the policemen, ABRI has two infantry battalions stationed year-round in East Timor: battalions 744 and 745. These two battalions, considered part of the territorial command, are not rotated out. The number of soldiers in them slightly increased in mid-1998: from 1,272 in July to 1,370 in August.

The third largest unit within the territorial command, just behind battalions 744 and 745, is the Mobile Brigade police (or *Brimob*). Designed to suppress riots and large-scale demonstrations, Brimob units function at one level above the police and one level below the army. With an expertise in crowd control, they are equipped with the full panoply of anti-riot weaponry: water cannons, armored vehicles, and automatic weapons. The Brimob unit "organic" to East Timor, number 5486, is supplemented with units rotated in from Indonesian provinces. The breakdown for the combat troops in August 1998 (Table 3d) lists three Brimob units: 5127 from north Sumatra, 5135 from Riau, and 5151 from Palembang. These three units add another 380 Brimob policemen to East Timor. Given that the total number of Brimob policemen in Indonesia is estimated at 10,000[51], East Timor's total of 1,013 means that East Timor receives a disproportionate

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[50] *Kompas*, 27 September 1998.

[51] Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, p. 111.

share. East Timor's population constitutes only .4 percent of Indonesia's yet it receives ten percent of the Brimob policemen.

The naval and air force bases on East Timor employ relatively few men. There are 82 at the Navy's base in Dili, 109 at the Air Force base in Dili, and 88 at the Air Force base in Bacau (Table 2c). It is clear that the army dominates the military activity in East Timor through its large numbers of territorial and combat troops.

The breakdown of the combat troops (Table 3d) reveals that the army has five full strength battalions in East Timor, each containing close to 1,000 men. Altogether, there are 4,929 soldiers in these five infantry battalions. They are drawn from various other commands on a rotating basis. As of August 1998, the following battalions were in East Timor: 315 (from West Java), 401 (from Central Java), 512 (from East Java) , 642 (from Kalimantan) and 144 (from North Sumatra).

The Army's Special Duty troops (*Satgas Darat*) constitute a large component of its total troop strength in East Timor. There are 1,448 soldiers in this category from four different units.

One of the most interesting tables among the leaked documents lists the names and ranks of the 464 NCOs posted to the Babinsas of East Timor (Table 9). Some villages have two NCOs stationed in them. According to the Indonesian government's statistics for late 1996, there are 442 villages in East Timor.[52] While there may have been a growth in the number of villages over the past two years, it is clear that the army has at least one NCO stationed in each village. In most provinces of Indonesia, a Babinsa covers more than one village. In East Timor, however, every single village is covered by a Babinsa. ABRI considers the Babinsa an extremely important source for intelligence about local level dissidents, regime opponents, and armed insurgents.[53] From the capitol city to the village, from the powerful Korem to the lowly Babinsa in the village, East Timor is permeated by the military.

The Special Forces: Kopassus, the Para-militaries, and Rajawali

The one ABRI unit that has been disproportionately responsible for human rights violations in East Timor since the late 1980s is the Special Forces Command: Kopassus (*Komando Pasukan Khusus*). As an elite unit of highly trained soldiers, the Special Forces have often been deployed for clandestine operations within Indonesia. Over the

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[52] *Dua Puluh Tahun Timor Timur Membangun*, p. 46; Bureau of Statistics, *East Timor in Figures* (1997).

[53] The former Kodam commander of Jakarta, Brig. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, described the importance of the Babinsa in an interview with a weekly magazine: "Our eyes and ears are the people. How does that work? It's the territorial command structure (*pembinaan teritorial*). For this we have the Babinsa. The Babinsa is the spear tip of the territorial command structure. Take the Babinsa of Jakarta. It has 2,000 people and in each small district (*kelurahan*) there are two or three people. ... In the language of intelligence operations, it is possible to call the Babinsa a cell. But in the present situation, we use the term 'friend' (*mitra*)." *Forum Keadilan*, 6 October 1997.

past ten years their troops have been primarily deployed in the three regions of the country where the government faced its greatest threat from movements demanding greater autonomy or independence: Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor.[54]

While Kopassus has been involved in military operations in East Timor since 1975, its centrality in the machinery of repression dates from the time the infamous Lt. Col. Prabowo arrived in 1989. Prabowo, the son-in-law of Suharto, was the architect of the para-military gangs one finds listed in Table 24 (dated April 1998). Taking a cue from the Japanese in wartime Indonesia and Ernest Röhm in 1930s Germany, he recruited teen-aged East Timorese males into youth gangs that promoted martial arts and a warrior culture. He liberally dispensed money to these gangs and used them as an indigenous source of intelligence and military manpower. *Gada Paksi*, the Boy Scout-type front for the 12 gangs listed in Table 24, received 400 million rupiah from Prabowo in 1995 (equivalent to about $200,000 at that time).[55] A gang, or Team (*Tim*) in ABRI parlance, was created in every district of East Timor, excepting Dili and the enclave district of Ambeno in West Timor. Each has a distinctive name: Saka Team in Bacau, Alfa Team in Lospalos, Makikit Team in Viqueque, etc.

As he was creating predatory youth gangs in East Timor, Prabowo also brought to Jakarta one of his East Timorese protégés, Hercules Rozario Marcal, and established a power base for him in the lucrative black market economy of the Tanah Abang neighborhood.[56] It has been widely rumored that Prabowo was able to acquire huge sums of under-the-table money from his brother, Hashim, who is a prominent businessman in Jakarta. Some of the money for patronizing youth gangs may also have come from the businesses that Kopassus itself owns.[57]

According to Table 3d, the number of Kopassus troops in East Timor is relatively small: 403 men in three companies. But they are particularly active, along with their allied para-military gangs, in hunting down the civilian supporters of the guerrillas. If one looks at Table A above, one finds that Kopassus has been involved in five of the twenty incidents of extra-judicial killings for the first half of 1998 and the para-military teams have been involved in six. The para-military members have also been involved in attacks on the armed resistance; eleven were killed in combat (*gugur*) from April 1997 to April 1998 (Table 24).

The para-military gangs appear to be listed in the secret documents as the Civil Defense corps (*Wanra*) of the Kopassus troops. The total number of gang members is 1,200 (Table 24). The total number of Wanra members listed as part of Kopassus units 6 and 7 is also 1,200 (Table 3d). Given the well-known connection between these gangs and Kopassus, one can reliably assume that the figure for Wanra indeed refers to the

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[54] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, pp. 86-89. ABRI's division for special forces has gone through a number of name changes since its founding in 1952. From 1971-86, it was called Covert Warfare Forces Command (Kopassandha). It was given the name Kopassus in 1986.

[55] This is according to its head, Marcal de Almeida. *Suara Timor Timur*, 13 August 1998. The name of the organization stands for *Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi* (Youth Guards for Integration).

[56] For an interview with Hercules and reports on Jakarta gangs, see *Forum Keadilan*, 17 November 1997.

[57] On Kopassus's business interests, see *Prospek*, 24 August 1998.

paramilitary gangs. Kopassus's Civil Defense members outnumber those attached to all other ABRI units combined.

These para-military teams are notorious as Indonesia's equivalent of the *Sturm Abteilungen* -- lawless and volatile elements cultivated to terrorize the population. Even the pro-integration and loyalist daily newspaper in Dili, *Suara Timor Timur*, has called for their disbandment.[58] Prabowo's dramatic fall from grace in the days immediately following Suharto's resignation has reportedly diminished some of their power and wealth. But they still operate and are being patronized and utilized by other units within ABRI. They were particularly important for turning out for the showcase pro-integration rallies in late June 1998 during the visit of three European ambassadors.

The government has consistently portrayed these para-military organizations gangs as autonomous associations that spontaneously formed to support the continued integration of East Timor within Indonesia. It is obvious from these tables, however, that they are part and parcel of ABRI's army of occupation. The government claims that the withdrawal of ABRI troops would bring about a violent conflict between pro and anti-integration East Timorese yet the only mass-based pro-integration forces that exist in East Timor are these brownshirt gangs trained, funded, and armed by ABRI. They can be easily disbanded and, with a little more effort, reintegrated into East Timorese society. Disconcerted by the government's budget cutbacks and the fall his patron Prabowo, the head of Gada Paksi has stated that he would be willing to disband his organization if the members were given loans so that they could start up their own small businesses.[59] While there is no reason to reward the para-military youth with special concessions, some method could be found for re-socializing them once ABRI stops funding them.

A Kopassus-affiliated unit which does not appear in these leaked documents is Rajawali (Eagle). A correspondent for the magazine of mercenaries, *Soldier of Fortune*, reported that the Rajawali troops are "hunter" units formed in 1995 for patrolling in the remote areas. Instead of being fixed to a base camp, in the way the territorial troops are, the Rajawali troops are 12-man platoons living in the forested hills like the guerrillas for extended periods of time.[60] Human rights groups in East Timor informed me that the Rajawali troops tend to presume that anyone in the hills is supplying or contacting the guerrillas. A person picking coffee or grazing livestock becomes an immediate suspect. From Table A above, one can see that Rajawali troops were involved in seven of the twenty incidents of extra-judicial killing, the highest number of any unit in East Timor.

The *Soldier of Fortune* correspondent believed there were 12 companies of Rajawali troops consisting of over 3,000 soldiers. This is likely to be an overestimation. That the leaked documents make no reference to Rajawali probably indicates that its personnel is drawn from the units that are listed. Though Rajawali is not an official component of Kopassus, it receives training and guidance from Kopassus given that its

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[58] *Suara Timor Timur*, editorial, "Gada Paksi Boleh Bubar? (Can the Youth Guards be Disbanded?)," 14 August 1998.

[59] *Suara Timor Timur*, "Gadapaksi Boleh Bubar, Asal Dijamin (The Youth Guards Can be Disbanded, If [Economic] Base is Guaranteed)," 13 August 1998.

[60] *Soldier of Fortune* (September 1997).

covert "hunter" methods fall under the category of "special operations." Ominously, the correspondent also reported the existence in East Timor of Detachment 81, Kopassus's covert operations branch, and a special "counter-terrorist" branch of the police called *Gegana*.

If there is to be a withdrawal of ABRI troops from East Timor, the first that should be withdrawn are the Kopassus and Rajawali units. Simultaneously, there should be a disbandment of the para-military teams. The removal of these three forces would do much to reduce the terror under which the East Timorese civilian population is presently forced to live.

The East Timorese in ABRI

After twenty three years of a military occupation, ABRI has managed to recruit 6,095 East Timorese into the army and the police (Table 17b). This might appear as an indication of ABRI's success in winning over the indigenous population. However, the tables suggest that ABRI is highly suspicious of the East Timorese it has recruited. While incorporating thousands of East Timorese into its structure, the army restricts them to inessential positions and ensures that it does not have to rely upon them for sustaining the military occupation.

There are very few East Timorese officers. Out of 250 high ranking officers (*Perwira*) in East Timor, only two are East Timorese (Table 18). The Korem is, of course, commanded by an Indonesian.[61] The thirteen Kodims are all commanded by Indonesians, as are all 62 of the Koramils. From the listing of 211 top positions in the territorial command (comprising the staffs of the Korem, Kodims, and Koramils), I was unable to identify one Portuguese or East Timorese sounding name (Table 6). The highest ranking East Timorese are three Majors and none of them have been given a command post: one works in the social-political affairs department of the Manatuto Kodim, one is an ABRI representative to the Manatuto district assembly, and the other is an assistant at the central police station in Dili (Table 17b). All three are listed as "Ex-Tropas," indicating that they are holdovers from the Portuguese army in East Timor prior to 1975. They are now likely to be near retirement age. Apart from these three, ABRI employs one East Timorese Captain, two 1st Lieutenants, eight 2nd Lieutenants, four assistants to 1st Lieutenants, two assistants to 2nd Lieutenants, and 492 sergeants (Table 17b).

Ninety percent of the East Timorese in ABRI are corporals and privates (5,505 out of 6,095). Even these low ranking recruits are not always entitled to the status of a regular soldier: 53 percent of the privates belong to an adjunct program aptly called Militerization (*Militerisasi*, abbreviated as *Milsas*). Table 1d reveals that the rank and file soldiers (*Tamtama*) are divided into two classifications: "organic" and "militerization." The latter category consists of recruits who have been given three months of training, a uniform, and a weapon. They are not considered regular soldiers. All of the Milsas soldiers, 2,583

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[61] As a public relations gesture, ABRI often assigns a Christian to the post; the present commander, Col. Suratman, for instance, is a Protestant and the vice-commander is a Catholic. The religious identity of a commander is of little consequence: the ABRI officer who designed the 1975 invasion and oversaw the worst killings of the first decade was Gen. Benny Murdani, a Catholic.

in August 1998, are East Timorese recruited and maintained by the Kodims (Tables 2c and 15).[62]

ABRI boasts of the fact that it has two battalions, 744 and 745, that are allegedly all-East Timorese. Table 18 reveals that of the 47 high-ranking officers that command the two battalions, none are East Timorese. Of the 235 middle-ranking officers, 70 percent are non-East Timorese. Even among the rank-and-file soldiers, the majority, 77 percent, are non-East Timorese. These "East Timor" battalions turn out to consist almost entirely of Indonesians.

The personnel department at the Korem office keeps track of the number of family members of the East Timorese soldiers. The 3,918 East Timorese soldiers attached to the Kodims and Battalions 744 and 745 have 18,022 wives and children (Table 19). If one assumes the other East Timorese soldiers within ABRI (there are 6,095 total) marry and have children at the same rate, then the total number of wives and children would be 24,509. This means that about three percent of the East Timorese population is directly dependent upon ABRI employment. For the impoverished East Timorese, the prospect of a regular paycheck is no doubt the main reason for joining the military. The pro-independence activists, recognizing the economic compulsions, do not consider the East Timorese soldiers in ABRI to be a serious and committed source of resistance to their movement.[63]

ABRI's Control over Civilian Institutions

Under the current government of President Habibie, ABRI continues to have a powerful hold over the Indonesian civilian administration. The Minister for Home Affairs is an army general. Half of the 27 provincial governors are active duty ABRI officers, as are 40-50 percent of the 309 district chiefs (*bupatis*).[64] The current governor of Jakarta, Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso, commanded troops as a captain during the 1975 invasion of East Timor.

One of the leaked documents is a listing of the ABRI personnel assigned to posts in East Timor's civil administration (Table 4). It reveals that ABRI has 83 officers within the executive branch of the provincial government. The total number of executive branch posts is not given so it is impossible to say what percentage of the posts ABRI occupies. However, it is clear that the military occupies the key positions. The Vice-governor and two Assistant Governors are ABRI officers. While ABRI has few qualms about posting

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[62] That all the Milsas soldiers are East Timorese can be ascertained from the following figures: the total number of Milsas soldiers was 2,743 in November 1997 (Table 1a). The total number of East Timorese soldiers in the Milsas program just three months prior, in August 1997, was even higher: 2,968 (Table 16).

[63] Oral interviews in Dili, August 1998.

[64] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 September 1998. The military has held similar percentages of the posts in the civil government for at least the past twenty years. In 1977, ABRI officers occupied 70 percent of the governor offices and 56 percent of the *bupati* offices. They occupied 76 of the 142 highest posts in the central government (or 53 percent). David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 198.

an officer to the governorship of any of Indonesia's 26 provinces, in East Timor, the so-called 27th province, it has consistently kept an East Timorese in the governor's office since 1976. While it is much more powerful in East Timor than in Indonesia, ABRI's authority is more controversial and thus demands greater dissimulation.

ABRI officers occupy three of the thirteen district heads (*bupatis*), all thirteen directorships of the district-level Social-Political Affairs departments, and thirty one village head positions (out of 442). ABRI officers occupy the key centers of economic decision-making as well: namely, the directorships of the Provincial Planning Board, the Cooperative Department, and the Regional Development Bank, among other institutions.

The military largely controls the provincial legislative assembly, the DPRD, and ensures that it remains nothing more than a rubber stamp for the occasional regulation the executive branch bothers to send it. ABRI officers occupy a fixed 25 percent of the seats in the assembly (9 out of 36). The government's own party, Golkar, which the military assists during election time so that it receives its target of about 70 percent of the vote, holds 20 of the 27 elected seats. The government's official publication, *Twenty Years of Development in East Timor* (1996), boasts that the relationship between the executive and the legislative branch in East Timor has been one of "smooth cooperation" without any signs of "confrontational attitudes."[65]

ABRI's Future in East Timor

ABRI's authority in East Timor, as in Indonesia, has become much more precarious after the fall of Suharto. Without the guarantees of immunity enjoyed under Suharto, ABRI has been hesitant and uncertain how to respond to the new upsurge of mass meetings and non-violent demonstrations in support of independence. The emboldened East Timorese have been seizing their liberties and openly expressing their views for the first time since 1975.[66] The army of occupation has continued with many of its old habits -- banning meetings, firing upon demonstrators, and executing civilians -- but with less frequency and severity. It has maintained the practice of exacting reprisals upon civilians for guerrilla attacks, as indicated by its killings in Alas (Manufahi distict) in November 1998.[67]

ABRI will find it increasingly more difficult to persist in its old practices. Not only have the East Timorese had a rare taste of liberty, the Indonesian public is becoming much more aware of what ABRI has been doing in East Timor. Now that the Indonesian press is freer, the reality of the East Timorese situation is slowly dawning on a public indoctrinated by 23 years of state propaganda. The efforts by the East Timorese resistance since the late 1980s to develop a linkage with the pro-democracy movement are now bearing fruit. East Timorese students studying in Indonesia have imported their struggle into the 'mother country' and enlightened students and NGO activists about ABRI's

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[65] *Dua Puluh Tahun Timor Timur Membangun*, p. 91.

[66] See my brief report, "Suharto's Fall: A New Era in East Timor," *Estafeta* (USA), vol. 4, no. 2 (summer 1998).

[67] *The Age*, "More than 50 feared dead as East Timor crisis deepens," 23 November 1998.

atrocities there.[68] The People's Democratic Party (PRD), created by Indonesian youths in their twenties, were pioneers in advocating a referendum for East Timor. PRD activists organized protests with East Timorese students studying in Java in 1995-96.[69] (The PRD leaders are presently serving sentences for "subverting the state ideology" in the same prison as Xanana Gusmão. President Habibie has explicitly refused to release them because of their "Marxism.") At present, all four of the main opposition political parties have either openly advocated a referendum (PAN, led by Amien Rais; PUDI, led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas, who was also in prison with the PRD and Xanana) or have hinted that they would probably favor a referendum (PDI-Struggle, led by Megawati; PKB, led by Gus Dur). Significantly, Amien Rais, whose positions are often ambiguous, has clearly articulated his support for a referendum.[70] If ABRI permits the Indonesian government to become subject to democratic controls and permits the Indonesian press to report honestly on East Timor, it will almost certainly have to reduce its presence there and scale back the violence it has unleashed upon the East Timorese society for over two decades.

The U.S. government could play an important role in helping end the military occupation by encouraging the United Nations to expand its interventions in East Timor. In the summer of 1998, both houses of the U.S. Congress passed resolutions in support of a referendum in East Timor and urged the Clinton administration to work towards that goal. So far the Clinton administration has done very little to act upon these resolutions. It could start by insisting that U.N. personnel be maintained in East Timor to monitor ABRI troop levels and human rights conditions.

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[68] The East Timorese student association, Renetil (National Resistance of the Timorese Students), founded in 1986, was important in this regard. One of its leaders, Fernando da Araujo, was arrested on November 19, 1991 for organizing a protest in Jakarta against the November 12 massacre in Dili. His defense plea was published by an Indonesian NGO: *Anak Muda Timor Timur Melihat Persoalan Bangsanya* (An East Timorese Youth Considers the Issue of his Nation) (Jakarta: Pijar, 1994). There are, in 1998, an estimated 2,000 East Timorese students studying in Indonesia.

[69] George J. Aditjondro, "Challenges and Prospects of the Indonesian Pro-East Timor Movement," unpublished paper, January 1997. Today, two NGOs exist in Jakarta whose purpose is to educate the Indonesian public on East Timor and advocate the holding of a referendum: Solidarity Forum for the East Timorese People and Solidarity for Peace in East Timor.

[70] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 November 1998.

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